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Discrimination of tenants with a visual impairment on the housing market: 
Empirical evidence from correspondence tests 
 
Abstract 
Background 
According to the social model of disability, physical ‘impairments’ become disabilities through 
exclusion in social relations. An obvious form of social exclusion might be discrimination, for instance 
on the rental housing market. Although discrimination has detrimental health effects, very few 
studies have examined discrimination of people with a visual impairment. 
Objectives 
We aim to study (1) the extent of discrimination of individuals with a visual impairment on the rental 
housing market and (2) differences in rates of discrimination between landowners and real estate 
agents. 
Methods 
We conducted correspondence tests among 268 properties on the Belgian rental housing market. 
Using matched tests, we compared reactions by realtors and landowners to tenants with and tenants 
without a visual impairment.  
Results 
The results show that individuals with a visual impairment are substantially discriminated against in 
the rental housing market: at least one in three lessors discriminate against individuals with a visual 
impairment. We further discern differences in the propensity towards discrimination according to 
the type of lessor. Private landlords are at least twice as likely to discriminate against tenants with a 
visual impairment than real estate agents. At the same time, realtors still discriminate against one in 
five tenants with a visual impairment. 
Conclusions 
This study shows the substantial discrimination against visually people with an impairment. Given the 
important consequences discrimination might have for physical and mental health, further research 
into this topic is needed. 
 
  
3 
 
1. Introduction 
Since the end of the twentieth century, scholars began to consider disability from a sociological 
perspective instead of a medical and individual viewpoint. According to the social model of disability, 
there is an important difference between physical ‘impairments’ on the one hand and ‘disabilities’ on 
the other.1,2,3 Whereas the first refer to physical conditions, the latter emphasize the material factors, 
social relations and power structures that exclude people with a disability. People are disabled by 
society in reaction to their impairments. This paradigm shift was accompanied with a new social 
movement that politically addressed the social exclusion of  people with a disability. 
Following this social model of disability, Gordon and Rosenblum3 argue that the social exclusion of 
people with a disability might be compared to those of other socially constructed categories, like 
racial, gender or sexual orientation groups. An obvious form of social exclusion is discrimination on 
the labour and housing markets. Although there are numerous empirical studies in Europe about 
discrimination on the basis of ethnicity4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14, gender4,7,8,15 and sexual orientation16,17,18,19, 
research into discrimination of people with a disability is scarce. A meta-analysis of discrimination 
research conducted since 2000 showed that there were only four studies on disability20: two studies 
on housing discrimination in the United States21,22, one study on hiring discrimination in Scotland23, 
and one study on product market discrimination in the United States24. Not surprisingly, an extensive 
consultation of people with a disability organisations in European countries revealed, among many 
other topics, the need for more evidence-based research on types of discriminatory behaviour and 
how disability non-discrimination law works in practice25. 
Discrimination refers to the unequal treatment of people on the basis of a protected ground, such as 
ethnicity, gender or disability. There is compelling evidence that discrimination has profound 
negative effects on both mental and physical health.26,27,28,29 The detrimental effects may occur 
through the mechanisms of stress responses and adapted health behaviours.28 Given these profound 
health consequences, it is remarkable that discrimination of people with a disability is so little 
examined. 
The first aim of this study is to address this blind spot by examining the discrimination of people with 
a visual impairment on the rental housing market in Belgium. We focus on the social exclusion of this 
specific group for two reasons. Firstly, scientific studies on housing market discrimination of tenants 
with a visual impairment are very scarce. Most previous discrimination studies examined other types 
of impairments (e.g. being deaf, in a wheelchair or having a service animal) and/or other domains of 
life (e.g. labour or product markets). Secondly, the message of the social model of disability is 
especially compelling in the case of housing where physical housing characteristics (such as steps, 
chairs, lack of space…) are disabling people with a physical impairment.30,31,32 Therefore, the danger 
of being ‘put away’ is especially high on the housing market. Qualitative research among Belgian 
lessors showed that lessors are especially averse to people with a disability with assistance dogs.33 In 
line with racism and sexism, one can speak about ‘ocularcentrism’: a social perspective that is 
dominated by vision.34 Since all underlying mechanisms of discrimination are also at work with 
respect to people with a visual impairment (such as categorization, stereotyping and stigmatization), 
our first hypothesis is that tenants with a visual impairment are discriminated on the Belgian housing 
market. 
4 
 
The second aim of this study is to examine whether the occurrence of discrimination differs between 
private landlords and real estate agents. In Belgium, the equal treatment of people with and without 
impairments is protected by several anti-discrimination laws.35,36 It is prohibited for lessors to refuse 
disabled candidate-renters because of their assistance dogs. Moreover, lessors might be asked to 
provide reasonable accommodation in favour of people with a disability. We expect that real estate 
agents are better informed about these anti-discrimination policies than private landlords. To 
exercise the profession of real estate agent in Belgium, one has to follow courses in which 
discrimination legislation is taught. Moreover, real estate agents get frequently up-to-date 
information about anti-discrimination policies through interest groups and government brochures. 
Therefore, our second hypothesis is that real estate agents discriminate people with a visual 
impairment less than private landlords. 
 
2. Methods 
Context 
We conducted an e-mail correspondence study among real estate agents and private landlords who 
rented out dwellings in the Belgian city of Ghent. The city of Ghent is the third largest city in Belgium, 
with 252,333 inhabitants at the start of 2014. The housing market in Belgium consists of 70.5% 
privately owned dwellings, 20.4% private dwellings to rent and 9.1% public housing or other forms of 
housing.37 In urbanised areas, however, the share of home owner is much smaller. In Ghent, the 
share of home owners is only 51.6%. 
Correspondence tests 
Properties available on the private rental housing market in Ghent were selected in this study from 
Immoweb.be, one of the major real estate advertising websites in Belgium with, according to their 
website, over 150,000 real estate advertisements. All private dwellings with a rent of €1250 or below 
per month were eligible for the study. However, to avoid suspicion among real estate agents and 
landlords who offered multiple properties for rent, they were contacted about only one property. If 
lessors had more than one property available, we randomly selected one advertisement from the list. 
749 properties were available for rent at the moment of the correspondence tests. Of these, 37 
(4.9%) had a monthly rent above €1250. Of the remaining 712 properties, we removed 444 (62.4%). 
These 444 properties are offered by lessors for whom we already selected a property for the 
correspondence tests. In total, we retained 268 different dwellings to let after this selection. 
Those lessors were contacted by a pair of e-mails. One e-mail was sent by a test profile, the other by 
a control profile. The test person presented himself as a friend of a visually impaired person. He 
asked whether the dwelling is still available and whether it is possible for him and his friend with 
assistance dog to visit the dwelling. By signalling explicitly both the visual impairment and the 
assistance dog in the e-mail, it was clear for lessors that it concerns a candidate-tenant with a 
characteristic protected by anti-discrimination laws. The control person did not provide any 
information about his physical condition and asked the same two questions: whether the dwelling is 
still available and whether he can visit the property. E-mails by the visually impaired test profile were 
always sent first, with the email of the control person following the same day. Lessors who dislike a 
5 
 
particular candidate often inaccurately tell that the property is no longer available. By including a test 
profile, we were able to assess whether the property was really unavailable. Moreover, since both e-
mails were semi-identical and were sent at almost the same time to the same lessor, an unequal 
treatment can only be attributed to the physical condition of both profiles. In discrimination 
research, the use of e-mails are preferred over telephone calls or visits, because e-mails can be more 
standardized than personal contacts.38,39 The disadvantage of correspondence e-mail tests is that 
response rates are, in general, lower. We speak about non-response when lessors did not answer on 
the e-mails of both profiles. The response rate in this study was 50.4%. 
Dependent variables 
Discrimination occurs when one candidate was invited to visit the property and the other not, or vice 
versa. Theoretically, the unequal treatment can be negative (the control person was invited, but not 
the visually impaired candidate) or positive (the impaired candidate was invited, but not the control 
person).  
To test our two hypotheses, we present two different analyses. For our first hypothesis, we examine 
the occurrence of discrimination in the housing market. To test this hypothesis, we first calculate the 
net discrimination rate. The net discrimination rate is the percentage of dwellings where the visually 
impaired candidate was negatively discriminated on the one hand minus the percentage of dwellings 
where the impaired candidate was positively discriminated on the other.38 In this respect, the 
discrimination rate can be interpreted as the percentage of properties for whom the visually 
impaired are disadvantaged. We test whether this net discrimination rate differs significantly from 
zero by performing a two-sided McNemar test. 
For the second hypothesis, we examine differences in discrimination according to characteristics of 
the properties and the lessor. To test the hypothesis, we assess whether there are significant 
differences in the odds of being discriminated against by either landlords or real estate agents. 
Therefore, we perform binary logistic regression. The dependent variable for this analyses is a 
dichotomous variable indicating whether the visually impaired candidate was negatively 
discriminated against (i.e. value 1) or not (i.e. value 0). 
Independent variables 
The independent variables regarding the property are based on the self-administered information 
supplied by the lessors on the real estate website. The main independent variable ‘lessor’ 
distinguishes between realtors and private landlords (reference category). In addition, we control for 
the monthly rent and the type of property. Rent is a metric variable indicating the monthly fee in 
Euro to rent the property, excluding additional costs for water and energy. We divided the rent by 
100 so that the order of magnitude of the variance corresponds more closely to the odds of the 
dependent variables. Type of dwelling is a categorical variable with three categories: studio 
apartment, apartment and house (reference category). Table 1 displays the descriptive statistics. 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE. 
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3. Results 
From table 2 we can see that tenants with a visual impairment are commonly discriminated on the 
private rental housing market in Ghent. The net discrimination rate is 35.6%. This net discrimination 
rate differs significantly from zero (χ² = 34.910; df = 1; p < 0.001). This means that visually impaired 
candidate-tenants are discriminated by more than one in three lessors. Therefore, we can conclude 
that our first hypothesis is supported by the results of our correspondence tests: visually impaired 
persons are substantially discriminated against in the rental housing market. 
 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
To test our second hypothesis, a difference in discrimination based on the type of lessor, we look at 
the results of the logistic regression analyses in table 3. We notice a significant negative Log Odds of 
real estate agents. This means that real estate agents are less likely to discriminate against tenants 
with a visual impairment. The difference between real estate agents and landlords can be considered 
quite substantial: with an odds ratio of 0.424 (𝑒−0.859), real estate agents discriminate less than half 
as often as landlords. At the same time, however, the net discrimination rate among real estate 
agents is still significantly different from zero (21.4%; χ² = 6.545; df = 1; p < 0.011). Although there is 
a significant and substantial difference between private landlords and real estate agents, both types 
of lessors discriminate against tenants with a visual impairment. We can conclude that we found 
support for our second hypothesis: real estate agents are less likely to discriminate against tenants 
with a visual impairment when compared to landlords. 
 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
4. Conclusion and discussion 
In this paper, we examined the social exclusion that individuals with a visual impairment face when 
looking for housing. By conducting correspondence tests among 268 lessors we provided robust 
estimations of the occurrence of discrimination in the rental housing market in the Belgian city of 
Ghent. We had two main goals: (1) assessing the level of disadvantage for tenants with a visual 
impairment and (2) examining differences in the rate of discrimination between private landlords 
and real estate agents. The results lead to two important conclusions. 
 
First, we found that individuals with a visual impairment who look for housing in the private rental 
market face substantial levels of discrimination. More than one in three lessors discriminate against 
individuals with a visual impairment. This number is comparable to previous research in the US and 
Italy.21,22,40 This shows that both in the US, Italy and in this Belgian city individuals with a visual 
impairment are confronted with structural discrimination. Moreover, the net discrimination rate is 
comparable to previous research on rental housing discrimination against ethnic minorities in 
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Europe, and in some cases even higher.4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14 The argument by Gordon and Rosenblum3 
that discrimination against individuals with a visual impairment might be compared to discrimination 
based on other criteria seems defensible, at least in order of magnitude. Our results confirm that the 
discrimination of individuals with a visual impairment is a tangible problem. Within social relations, 
visual impairments indeed become disabilities, as described in the social model of disability.1,2,3,34 
Second, distinguishing between the type of lessor shows that real estate agents are less prone to 
discriminate against individuals with a visual impairment than private landlords. Private landlords 
discriminate more than twice as often as compared to realtors. Some previous studies into 
discrimination against ethnic minorities already showed important differences between private 
landlords and real estate agents.41 The behaviour of these real estate agents has often been 
explained as a form of catering to the wishes of the actual owners of the properties who fear value 
loss of the property if neighbourhoods become minority-dominated areas. However, this is less likely 
for individuals with an impairment. We believe that the divergence between realtors and landlords 
might lay in a better knowledge of anti-discrimination laws and provisions for individuals with an 
impairment in this legislation. At the same time, this better knowledge does not result in the absence 
of discrimination: still one in five realtors discriminate against individuals with a visual impairment. 
Following the recommendations of Froehlich-Grobe and her colleagues31 for public housing, we think 
education and compliance are needed to ensure equal access to the private rental market. 
This study has also its limitations. First, we mapped only the very early stages of a candidate’s effort 
to rent a property. Discrimination may occur at any time throughout the rental process, from first 
contact to the end of the rental period. Previous research has also indicated that discrimination is 
common during other steps in the process.42 However, this means that we have estimated a 
conservative discrimination rate: the percentage of candidates excluded during the very first stage of 
the rental process. Any discrimination in later stages will only increment the discrimination rate. 
Therefore, discrimination against tenants with a visual impairment might be even higher than the 
discrimination rate we found. 
Second, we did not disentangle discrimination based on the impairment itself on the one hand or the 
presence of the assistance dog in the property on the other. Lots of property owners forbid keeping 
pets or other animals. Although assistance dogs are exempt from this legal choice by property 
owners, discrimination might be due to preferences against pets or animals. Previous research has 
indeed shown that discrimination is predominantly directed towards the assistance dog and less so 
to the impairment itself.40 However, this disentangling is a theoretical issue. Given the compelling 
benefits of assistance dogs for people with a disability43, in real life most individuals with a visual 
impairment use assistance dogs and will face the combination of both preferences against tenants 
with a visual impairment and against assistance dogs. 
The third shortcoming is related to the structure of the housing market in Belgium. Given that 
Belgium is predominantly a buyers’ market, we monitored discrimination only in a limited segment of 
the housing market. Further research would do well to examine discrimination against candidates 
with a visual impairment who intend to buy as well, and could be extended to examining 
discrimination among credit institutions.44 
In sum, this study has shown that discrimination against individuals with a visual impairment in the 
rental housing market is substantial, among both private landlords and real estate agents. Given that 
8 
 
discrimination has a negative effect on both physical and mental health26,27,28,29, this finding should 
urge health researchers to devote more attention to social causes of health problems among 
individuals with an impairment. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
  Range Mean/Frequency SD/% 
Rent 3.9-12.5 7.359 (1.627) 
Property Type 
   House 0/1 55 (20.5%) 
Apartment 0/1 186 (69.4%) 
Studio 0/1 27 (10.1%) 
Lessors 
   Landlord 0/1 166 (61.9%) 
Real Estate 0/1 102 (38.1%) 
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Table 2. Net discrimination rate 
 
  Control person 
invited? 
 
  
    Yes No 
V
isu
ally im
p
aired
 
in
vite
d
? 
Yes 133 9 
No 57 69 
    Net discrimination rate 35.6% 
McNemar Test 34.910*** 
*** p < 0.001 
 
 
  
14 
 
Table 3. Logistic regression of negative discrimination against tenants with a visual impairment 
  Log Odds (Std. Err.) 
Intercept -0.263 
 
(0.471) 
  
   
Rent -0.069 
 
(0.126) 
Property type 
  House (Ref.) 
  Apartment 0.381 
 
(0.504) 
Studio 0.092 
 
(0.772) 
Real Estate Agents -0.859 * (0.372) 
  
  N 135    
*** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; * p < 0.05. 
 
 
 
 
